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The protracted debate on the welfare state has 
failed to produce conclusive answers as to either the 
nature or causes of welfare state development. This 
article has three aims: 1) to reintegrate the debate into 
the intellectual tradition of political economy. This 
serves to put into sharper focus the principal 
theoretical questions involved; 2) to specify what are 
the salient characteristics of welfare states. The 
conventional ways of measuring welfare states in terms of 
their expenditures will no longer do; 3) to "sociologize" 
the study of welfare states. Most studies have assumed a 
world of linearity: more or less power, industrialization 
or spending. This article insists that we understand 
welfare states as clusters of regime-types, and that 
their development must be explained interactively.
THE LEGACY OF CLASSICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
Contemporary welfare state debates have been guided 
by two questions. First, does social citizenship diminish 
the salience of class? Or, in other words, can the 
welfare state fundamentally transform capitalist society? 
Second, what are the causal forces behind welfare state 
development? These questions are not recent. Indeed, they 
were formulated by the 19th Century political economists 
100 years before any welfare state can rightfully be said 
to have come into existence. The classical political 
economists -- whether of liberal, conservative or Marxist 
persuasion --were pre-occupied with the relationship 
between capitalism and welfare. Their answers obviously 
diverged, but their analyses were unequivocally directed 




























































































the state (democracy). The 
largely normative: what is 
responsibility between market
question they asked 




Contemporary neo-1iberalism echoes the contributions 
of classical liberal political economy. To Adam Smith, 
the market was the superior means for the abolition of 
class, inequality and privilege. Aside from a necessary 
minimum, state intervention would likely stifle the 
equalizing process of competitive exchange, create 
monopolies, protectionism and inefficiency: the state 
upholds class, the market can potentially undo class 
society (Smith, 1961:11,especially pp.232-6).1
Liberal political economists were not necessarily of 
one mind when it came to policy advocacy. Nassau Senior 
and later Manchester liberals emphasized the laissez- 
faire element of Smith, rejecting any form of social 
protection outside the cash nexus. J.S.Mill and the 
"reformed liberals",in turn, were willing to let markets 
be regulated by a modicum of political regulation. Yet, 
they were all agreed that the road to equality and 
prosperity should be paved with a maximum of free markets 
and a minimum of state interference.
This enthusiastic embrace of market capitalism may 
now appear unjustified. But, we must take into account 
that the state which confronted these early political 
economists was tinged with legacies of absolutist 
privileges, mercantilist protectionisms, and pervasive 
corruption. They were attacking systems of governance 
which repressed the ideals of both freedom and 
enterprise. Hence, theirs was revolutionary theory, and 
from this vantage point, we can understand why Adam Smith 




























































































Democracy was an Achilles heel to many liberals. 
Their ideals of freedom and democratic participation were 
grounded in a world of small property owners; not of 
growing property-less masses who held in their sheer 
numbers the possibility of seizing state power. The 
liberals feared the principle of universal suffrage, for 
it would likely politicize the distributional struggle, 
pervert the market and fuel inefficiencies. Many liberals 
discovered that democracy would contradict the market.
Both conservative and Marxist political economists 
understood this contradiction, but proposed of course 
opposite solutions. The most coherent conservative 
critique of laissez faire came from the German historical 
school; in particular from Friedrich List, Adolph Wagner 
and Gustav Schmoller. They refused to believe that 
capitalist efficiency was best assured by the pure 
commodity status of workers in the raw cash nexus of the 
market. Instead, conservative political economy believed 
that patriarchical neo-absolutism could provide the kind 
of legal, political and social framework that would 
assure a capitalism without class struggle.
One prominent conservative school promoted a 
"Monarchical Welfare State" that would, at once, provide 
for social welfare, class harmony, loyalty, and 
productivity. It was discipline, not competition, that 
would guarantee efficiency. The state (or church) was the 
institution best equipped to harmonize conflicting 
interests. 3
Conservative political economy emerged in reaction 
to the French Revolution and the Paris Commune. It was 




























































































arrest the democratic impulse. It feared social 
levelling, and favored a society that retained both 
hierarchy and class. It held that class conflicts were 
not natural; that democratic mass participation, the 
dissolution of recognized rank and status boundaries were 
threats to social harmony.
The key to Marxian political economy, of course, was 
its rejection of the liberal claim that markets 
guarantee equality. Capitalist accumulation, as Dobb 
(1946) put it, disowns people of property with the end- 
result being ever deeper class divisions. Here, the 
state's role is not neutrally benevolent, nor is it a 
fountain of emancipation; it exists to defend property 
rights and the authority of capital. To Marxism this is 
the foundation of class dominance.
The central question, not only for Marxism but for 
the entire contemporary debate on the welfare state, is 
whether and under what conditions the class divisions and 
social inequalities produced by capitalism can be undone 
by parliamentary democracy. The liberals feared that 
democracy would produce socialism and they were 
consequently not especially eager to extend it. The 
socialists, in contrast, suspected that parliamentarism 
would be little more than an empty shell or, as Lenin 
suggested, a mere "talking shop" (Jessop, 1982). This 
line of analysis, echoed in much of contemporary Marxism, 
leads to the conclusion that social reforms emerge in 
response to the exigencies of capitalist reproduction, 
not to the emancipatory desires of the working classes.4
Among socialists, a more positive analysis of 
parliamentarism came to prevail after the extension of 




























































































sophisticated contributions came from Austro-PIarxists 
such as Adler and Bauer, and from German social 
democrats, especially Eduard Heimann. Heimann's (1929) 
starting point was that even conservative reforms may 
have been motivated by desires to repress labor 
mobilization, but that their very presence nonetheless 
alter the balance of class power: the social wage lessens 
the worker's dependence on the market and employers. The 
social wage is thus also a potential power resource that 
defines the frontier between capitalism and socialism. It 
introduces an alien element into the capitalist political 
economy. This intellectual position has enjoyed quite a 
renaissance in recent Marxism (0ffe,1985; Bowles and 
Gint is, 1986).
The social democratic model, as outlined above, did 
not necessarily abandon the orthodox assumption that 
fundamental equality requires economic socialization. 
Yet, historical experience soon demonstrated that 
socialization was a goal that could not be pursued 
realistically through parliamentarism.®
Social democracy's embrace of parliamentary 
reformism as its dominant strategy for equality and 
socialism was premised on two arguments. The first was 
that workers require social resources, health and 
education to participate effectively in a democratized 
economy. The second argument was that social policy is 
not only emancipatory, but it is also economically 
efficient (Myrdal & Myrdal, 1936). Following Marx on this 
point, the strategy therefore promotes the onward march 
of capitalist productive forces. But, the beauty of the 
strategy was that social policy would also assure social 
democratic power mobilization. By eradicating poverty, 



























































































state increases political capacities and diminishes the 
social divisions that are barriers to political unity 
among workers.
The social democratic model, then, puts forward one 
of the leading hypotheses of contemporary welfare state 
debate: the argument that parliamentary class 
mobilization is a means for the realization of socialist 
ideals of equality, justice, freedom and solidarity.
7
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WELFARE STATE
Our political economy forebears defined the analytic 
basis of much recent scholarship. They isolated the key 
variables of class, state, market and democracy; and they 
formulated the basic propositions about citizenship and 
class, efficiency and equality, capitalism and socialism. 
Contemporary social science distinguishes itself from 
classical political economy on two scientifically vital 
fronts. First, it defines itself as a positive science 
and shies away from normative prescription (Robbins, 
1976). Second, classical political economists had little 
interest in historical variability; they saw their 
efforts as leading towards a system of universal lak.ws. 
Although contemporary political economy sometimes still 
clings to the belief in absolute truths, the comparative 
and historical method that, today, underpins almost all 
good political economy is one that reveals variation and 
permeabi1i ty.
Despite these differences, most recent scholarship 
has as its focal point the state-economy relationship 
defined by 19th Century political economists. And, given 




























































































welfare state has become a major test case for contending 
theories of political economy.
Below, we shall review the contributions of 
comparative research on the development of welfare states 
in advanced capitalist countries. It will be argued that 
most scholarship has been misdirected, mainly because it 
became detached from its theoretical foundations. We must 
therefore recast both the methodology and concepts of 
political economy in order to adequately study the 
welfare state. This will constitute the focus of the 
final section of this paper.
Two types of approaches have dominated in the 
explanation of welfare states; one, a systemic (or, 
structuralist) theory; the other, an institutional or 
actor-oriented explanation.
THE SYSTEMS/STRUCTURALIST APPROACH
System- or structuralist theory seeks to capture the 
logic of development holistically. It will easily focus 
on the functional requisites for the reproduction of 
society and economy; it will be inclined to emphasize 
cross-national similarities rather than differences.
One variant begins with a theory of the industrial 
society, and argues that industrialization makes social 
policy both necessary and possible. It makes welfare 
states necessary because pre-industrial modes of social 
reproduction, such as the family, the church, noblesse 
oblige, and guild solidarity are destroyed by the forces 
attached to modernization -- social mobility, 



























































































crux of the matter 
substitute because it
9
is that the market is no adequate 
caters only to those who are able 
to perform in it. Hence, the "welfare function" is 
appropriated by the nation state. The welfare state is 
also made possible by the rise of modern bureaucracy as a 
rational, universalist and efficient form of 
organization. It is a means for managing collective 
goods, but also a center of power in its own right, and 
will thus be inclined to promote its own growth.
This kind of reasoning has informed the so-called 
"logic of industrialism" perspective, according to which 
the welfare state will emerge as the modern industrial 
economy destroys traditional forms of social security 
(Flora and Alber, 1981; Pryor, 1969). But, the thesis has 
difficulties explaining why government social policy only 
emerged 50 or even 100 years after traditional community 
was effectively destroyed? The basic response draws on 
Wagner's Law (1962;1883) and on Marshall (1920), namely 
that a certain level of economic development, and thus 
surplus, is needed in order to permit the diversion of 
scarce resources from productive use (investments) to 
welfare (Wilensky and Lebeaux, 1958). In this sense, the
perspective follows in the footsteps of the old liberals. 
Social redistribution endangers efficiency, and only at a 
certain economic level will a negative-sum trade-off be 
avoidable (Okun, 1975).
The new structural Marxism offers a surprisingly 
parallel analysis. It breaks with its classical 
forebears' strongly action-centered theory. Like the 
industrialism thesis, its analytical starting point is 
not the problems of markets, but the logic of a mode of 
production. Capital accumulation creates contradictions 




























































































tradition of Marxism, like its "logic of industrialism" 
counterpart, fails to see much relevance of actors in the 
promotion of welfare states. The point is that the state, 
as such, is positioned in such a way that it will serve 
the collective needs of capital. The theory is thus 
premised on two crucial assumptions: first, that power is 
structural and second, that the state is "relatively" 
autonomous from class directives (Poulantzas, 1973; 
Block, 1977; for a recent critical assessment of this 
literature, see Therborn, 1986; and Skocpol and Amenta, 
1986).
The "logic of capitalism" perspective invites 
difficult questions. If, as Przworski (1980) has argued, 
working class consent is assured on the basis of material 
hegemony, that is self-willed subordination to the 
system, it is difficult to see why up to 40 per cent of 
the national product must be allocated to the 
legitimation activities of a welfare state. A second 
problem is to derive state activities from a "mode of 
production" analysis. Eastern Europe may perhaps not 
qualify as socialist, but neither is it capitalist. Yet, 
there we find "welfare states", too. Perhaps 
accumulation has functional requirements in whichever way 
it proceeds? (Skocpol and Amenta, 1986; Bell, 1978).
THE INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH
The classical political economists made it clear why 
democratic institutions should influence welfare state 
development. The liberals feared that full democracy 
might jeopardize markets and inaugurate socialism. 
Freedom, in their view, necessitated a defence of markets 




























































































the laissez-faire state sought to accomplish. But it was 
this divorce of politics and economy which fuelled much 
of the institutionalist analyses. Best represented by 
Polanyi (1944), but also by a number of anti-democratic 
exponents of the historical school, the institutional 
approach insists that any effort to isolate the economy 
from social and political institutions will destroy human 
society. The economy must be embedded in social 
communities in order for it to survive. Thus, Polanyi 
sees social policy as one necessary precondition for the 
re-intégrât ion of the social economy.
11
An interesting recent variant of institutional 
alignment theory is the argument that welfare states 
emerge more readily in small, open economies that are 
particularly vulnerable to international markets. As 
Katzenstein (1985) and Cameron (1978) show, there is a 
greater inclination to regulate class distributional 
conflicts through government and interest concertation 
when both business and labor are captive to forces beyond 
domestic control.
The impact of democracy on welfare states has been 
argued ever since J.S. Mill and de Tocqueville. The 
argument is typically phrased without reference to any 
particular social agent or class. It is, in this sense, 
that it is institutional. In its classical formulation, 
the thesis was simply that majorities will favor social 
distribution to compensate for market weakness or market 
risks. If wage earners are likely to demand a social 
wage, so are capitalists (or farmers) apt to demand 
protection in the form of tariffs, monopoly or subsidies. 





























































































In its modern formulations, the democracy thesis has 
many variants. One identifies stages of nationbuilding in 
which full citizenship incorporation requires social 
rights (Marshal 1,1950; Bendix, 1964; Rokkan, 1970). A 
second variant, developed by both pluralist and public 
choice theory, argues that democracy will nurture intense 
party competition around the median voter that will, in 
turn, fuel rising public expenditures. Tufte (1978), for 
example, argues that major extensions of public 
intervention will occur around elections as a means of 
voter mobilization.
The democratic-institutionalist approach faces 
considerable empirical problems (Skocpol and Amenta, 
1986). According to the thesis, a democratic polity is 
the basic precondition for welfare state emergence, and 
welfare states are more likely to develop the more 
democratic rights are extended. Yet, the thesis confronts 
not only the historical oddity that the first major 
welfare state initiatives occurred prior to democracy, 
but also that they were often motivated by desires to 
arrest its realization. This was certainly the case in 
France under Napoleon II, in Germany under Bismarck, and 
in Austria under Taaffe. Conversely, welfare state 
development was most retarded where democracy arrived 
early, such as in the United States, Australia, and 
Switzerland. This apparent contradiction can be 
explained, but only with reference to social classes and 
social structure: nations with early democracy were 
overwhelmingly agrarian and dominated by small property 
owners who used their electoral powers to reduce, not 
raise, taxes (Dich, 1973). In contrast, ruling classes in 
authoritarian polities are better positioned to impose 




























































































SOCIAL CLASS AS A POLITICAL AGENT
We have noted that the case for a class mobilization 
thesis flows from social democratic political economy. It 
differs from structuralist and institutional analyses by 
its emphasis on the social classes as the main agents of 
change, and its argument that the balance of class power 
determines distributional outcomes. To emphasize active 
class mobilization does not necessarily deny the 
importance of structured or hegemonic power (Korpi,1983). 
But it is held that parliaments are, in principle, 
effective institutions for the translation of mobilized 
power into desired policies and reforms. Accordingly, 
parliamentary politics are capable of overriding 
hegemony, and may be made to serve interests that are 
antagonistic to capital. Further, the class mobilization 
theory assumes that welfare states do more than simply 
alleviate the current ills of the system; a "social 
democratic" welfare state will, in its own right, 
establish critical power resources for wage earners and, 
thus, strengthen labor movements. As Heimann (1929) 
originally held, social rights push back the frontiers of 
capitalist power and prerogatives.
The question of why the welfare state itself is a 
power resource is vital for the theory's applicability. 
The answer is that wage earners in the market are 
inherently atomized and stratified, compelled to compete, 
insecure and dependent on decisions and forces beyond 
their control. This limits their capacity for collective 
solidarity and mobilization. The social rights, income 
security, equalization and eradication of poverty that a 
universalistic welfare state pursues, are necessary 




























































































power mobilization demands (Esping-Andersen, 1985a).
The single most difficult problem for this thesis is 
to specify the conditions for power mobilization. Power 
depends on the resources that flow from the unity of 
electoral numbers and from collective bargaining. Power 
mobilization, in turn, depends on levels of trade union 
organization, vote shares, parliamentary- and cabinet 
seats held by left, or labor, parties. But how long a 
period of sustained power mobilization is required in 
order to produce decisive effects? If power is measured 
over a brief time span (5-10 years), we risk the fallacy 
of a "Blum"/"Mitterand" effect: a brief spell of leftist 
power that proves ineffectual because the left is ousted 
again before having had a chance to act.
There are several valid objections to the class 
mobilization thesis. Three, in particular, are quite 
fundamental. One, is that in advanced capitalist nations, 
the locus of decision making and power may shift from 
parliaments to neo-corporatist institutions of interest 
intermediation (Shonfield, 1965; Schmitter and Lembruch, 
1979). A second criticism is that the capacity of labor 
parties to influence welfare state development is 
circumscribed by the structure of rightist party power. 
Castles (1978; 1982) has argued that the degree of unity 
among the rightist parties is more important than is the 
activated power of the left. Other authors have 
emphasized the fact that denominational (usually social 
catholic) parties in countries such as Holland, Italy, 
and Germany mobilize large sections of the working 
classes and pursue welfare state programs not drastically 
at variance with their socialist competitors (Schmidt, 
1982; Wilensky, 1981). The class mobilization thesis has, 




























































































inclination to define the process of power mobilization 
too much on the basis of the rather extraordinary Swedish 
experience (Shalev, 1984).
These objections address a basic fallacy in the 
theory's assumptions about class formation: we cannot 
assume that socialism is the natural basis for wage- 
earner mobilization. Indeed, the conditions under which 
workers become socialists are still not adequately 
documented. Historically, the natural organizational 
bases of worker mobilization were pre-capitalist 
communities, especially the guilds, but also the Church, 
ethnicity or language. A ready-made reference to false 
consciousness will not do to explain why Dutch, Italian 
or American workers continue to mobilize around non­
socialist principles. The dominance of socialism in the 
Swedish working class is as much a puzzle as is the 
dominance of confessional ism in the Dutch.
The third and, perhaps, most fundamental objection 
has to do with the model's linear view of power. It is 
problematic to hold that a numerical increase in votes, 
unionization or seats will translate into more welfare 
statism. First, for socialist as for other parties, the 
magical "50 per cent" threshold for parliamentary 
majorities seems practically unsurmountable (Przworski, 
1985). Second, if socialist parties represent working 
classes in the traditional sense, it is clear that they 
will never succeed in their project. In very few cases 
has the traditional working class been numerically a 
majority; and its role is rapidly becoming marginal-*»
Probably the most promising way to resolve the 
combined linearity- and working class minority problem 




























































































breaking class coalition thesis to the transformation of 
the modern state (Weir and Skocpol, 1985; Gourevitch,
1986; Esping-Andersen, 1985a; Esping-Andersen &
Friedland, 1982). Thus, the origins of the keynesian full 
employment commitment and the social democratic welfare 
state edifice have been traced to the capacity of 
(variably) strong working class movements to forge a 
political alliance with farmers organizations; 
additionally, it is arguable that sustained social 
democracy has come to depend on the formation of a new 
working class-white collar coalition.
The class coalitional approach has additional 
virtues. Two nations, such as Austria and Sweden, may 
score similarly on working class mobilization variables, 
and yet produce highly unequal policy results. This can 
be explained by differences in the two countries' 
historical coalition formation: the breakthrough of
Swedish social democratic hegemony stems from its
capacity to forge the famous "red-green" alliance; the 
comparative disadvantage of the Austrian socialists rests 
in the "ghetto" status assigned to them by virtue of the 
rural classes being captured by a conservative coalition 
(Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1984).
In sum, we have to think in terms of social 
relations, not just social categories. Whereas
structural-functionalist explanations identify convergent 
welfare state outcomes, and class mobilization paradigms 
see large, but linearly distributed, differences, an 
interactive model such as the coalitions approach directs 
attention to distinct welfare state regimes 
WHAT IS THE WELFARE STATE ?



























































































welfare state. How do we know when and if a welfare state
responds functionally to the 
to capitalist reproduction and 
identify a welfare state that 
that a mobilized working class 
contending arguments unless 
conception of the phenomenon to
needs of industrialism, or 
legitimacy? And how do we 
corresponds to the demands 
might have? We cannot test 
we have a commonly shared 
be explained.
A remarkable attribute of the entire literature is 
its lack of much genuine interest in the welfare state as 
such. Welfare state studies have been motivated by 
theoretical concerns with other phenomena, such as power, 
industrialization or capitalist contradictions; the 
welfare state itself has generally received scant 
conceptual attention. If welfare states differ, how do 
they differ? And when, indeed, is a state a welfare 
state? This turns attention straight back to the 
original question: what is the welfare state?
A common textbook definition is that it involves 
state responsibility for securing some basic modicum of 
welfare for its citizens. Such a definition skirts the 
issue of whether social policies are emancipatory or not; 
whether they help system legitimation or not; whether 
they contradict or aid the market process; and what, 
indeed, is meant by "basic"? Would it not be more 
appropriate to require of a welfare state that it 
satisfies more than our basic or minimal welfare needs?
The first generation of comparative studies started 
with this type of conceptualization. They assumed, 
without much reflection, that the level of social 
expenditure adequately reflects a state's commitment to 
welfare. The theoretical intent was not really to arrive 




























































































test the validity of contending theoretical models in 
political economy. By scoring nations with respect to 
urbanization, level of economic growth, and the share of 
aged in the demographic structure, it was believed that 
the essential features of industrial modernization were 
adequately captured. Alternatively, by scoring nations on 
left party strength, or working class power mobilization 
(with complex weighted scores of trade unionism, 
electoral strength and cabinet power), others sought to 
identify the impact of working class mobilization as 
formulated in the social democratic model.
The findings of the first generation comparativists 
are extremely difficult to evaluate. No convincing case 
can be made for any particular theory. The shortage of 
nations for comparisons statistically restricts the 
number of variables that can be tested simultaneously. 
Thus, when Outright (1965) or Wilensky (1975) finds that 
economic level, with its demographic and bureaucratic 
correlates, explains most welfare state variations in 
"rich countries", relevant measures of working class 
mobilization or economic openness are not included. A 
conclusion in favor of a "logic of industrialism" view is 
therefore in doubt. And, when Hewitt (1977), Stephens 
(1979), Korpi (1983), Myles (1984) and Esping-Andersen 
(1985b) find strong evidence in favor of a working class 
mobilization thesis, or when Schmidt (1982; 1983) finds 
support for a neo-corporatist, and Cameron (1978) for an 
economic openness argument, it is without fully testing 
against the strongest alternative explanation.7
Most of these studies claim to explain the welfare 
state. Yet, their focus on spending may be irrelevant or, 
at best, misleading. Expenditures are epiphenomenal to 




























































































the linear scoring approach (more or less power, 
democracy or spending) contradicts the sociological 
notion that power, democracy, or welfare are relational 
and structured phenomena. By scorning welfare states on 
spending, we assume that all spending counts equally. 
But, some welfare states, the Austrian for example, spend 
a large share on benefits to privileged civil servants. 
This is normally not what we would consider a commitment 
to social citizenship and solidarity. Others spend 
disproportionally on means-tested social assistance. Few 
contemporary analysts would agree that a reformed poor 
relief tradition qualifies as a welfare state commitment - 
Some nations spend enormous sums on fiscal welfare in the 
form of tax privileges to private insurance plans that 
mainly benefit the middle classes. But these tax 
expenditures do not show up on expenditure accounts. In 
Britain, total social expenditure has grown during the 
Thatcher period; yet, this is almost exclusively a 
function of very high unemployment. Low expenditures on 
some programs may signify a welfare state more seriously 
committed to full employment.
Therborn (1983) is right when he holds that we must 
begin with a conception of state structure. What are the 
criteria with which we should judge whether, and when, a 
state is a welfare state? There are three approaches to 
this question. Therborn's proposal is to begin with the 
historical transformation of state activities. 
Minimally, in a genuine welfare state the majority of its 
daily routine activities must be devoted to servicing the 
welfare needs of households. This criterion has far- 
reaching consequences. If we simply measure routine 
activity in terms of spending and personnel, the result 
is that no state can be regarded as real welfare state 




























































































welfare states will still not qualify because the 
majority of their routine activities concern defence, law 
and order, administration and the like (Therborn, 1983). 
Social scientists have been too quick to accept nations' 
self-proclaimed welfare state status. They have also been 
too quick to conclude that the presence of the battery of 
typical social programs signify the birth of a welfare 
state.
The second conceptual approach derives from Richard 
Titmuss' (1958) classical distinction between residual 
and institutional welfare states. The former assumes that 
state responsibility begins only when the family or the 
market fails; its commitment is limited to marginal 
groups in society. The latter model addresses the entire 
population, is universalistic, and implants an 
institutionalized commitment to welfare. It will, in 
principle, extend welfare commitments to all areas of 
distribution vital for societal welfare. This approach 
has fertilized a variety of new developments in 
comparative welfare state research (Myles, 1984; Korpi, 
1980; Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1984;1986; Esping- 
Andersen, 1985b; 1987). And it has forced researchers to 
move away from the black box of expenditures and towards 
the content of welfare states: targeted versus 
universalistic programs, the conditions of eligibility, 
the quality of benefits and services and, perhaps most 
importantly, the extent to which employment and working 
life are encompassed in the state's extension of citizen 
rights. This shift to welfare state typologies makes 
simple linear welfare state rankings difficult to 
sustain. We might in fact be comparing categorically 
different types of states.




























































































criteria on which to judge types of welfare states. This 
can be done by measuring actual welfare states against
some abstract model and then by scoring programs, or
entire welfare states, accordingly (Day, 19 78; Myles,
1984). The weakness of this approach is that it is
ahistorical, and does not necessarily capture the ideals 
or designs that historical actors sought to realize in 
the struggles over the welfare state. If our aim is to 
test causal theories that involve actors, we should begin 
with the demands that were actually promoted by those 
actors that we deem critical in the history of welfare 
state development. It is difficult to imagine that anyone 
struggled for spending per se.
A RESPECIFICATION OF THE WELFARE STATE
Few can disagree with T.H. Marshall's (1950) 
proposition that social citizenship constitutes the core 
idea of a welfare state. What, then, are the key 
principles involved in social citizenship? In our view, 
they must involve first and foremost the granting of 
social rights. This mainly entails a de-commodification 
of the status of individuals vis-a-vis the market. 
Secondly, social citizenship involves social
stratification; one's status as a citizen will compete 
with, or even replace, one's class position. Thirdly, 
the welfare state must be understood in terms of the 
interface between the market, the family, and the state. 
These principles need to be fleshed out prior to any 





























































































As commodities in the market, workers depend for 
their welfare entirely on the cash-nexus. The question of 
social rights is thus one of de-commodification, that is 
of granting alternative means of welfare to that of the 
market. De-commodification may refer either to the 
service rendered, or to the status of a person, but in 
both cases it signifies the degree to which distribution 
is detached from the market mechanism. This means that 
the mere presence of social assistance or insurance may 
not necessarily bring about significant de­
commodification if they do not substantially emancipate 
individuals from market dependence. Means-tested poor 
relief will possibly offer a security blanket of last 
resort. But if benefits are low and attached with social 
stigma, the relief system will compel all but the most 
desperate to participate in the market. This was 
precisely the intent of the 19th Century poor laws. 
Similarly, most of the early social insurance programs 
were deliberately designed to maximize labor market 
performance (Ogus, 1979). Benefits required long 
contribution periods and were tailored to prior work 
effort. In either case, the motive was to avert work- 
disincentive effects.
There is no doubt that de-commodification has been a 
hugely contested issue in welfare state development. For 
labor, it has always been a priority. When workers are 
completely market dependent, they are difficult to 
mobilize for solidaristic action. Since their resources 
mirror market inequalities, divisions emerge between the 
"ins" and the "outs", making labor movement formation 



























































































weakens the absolute authority of the employer. It is for 
exactly this reason that employers always opposed de- 
commodi f i cat i on.
De-commodified rights are differentially developed 
in contemporary welfare states. In social assistance 
dominated welfare states rights are not so much attached 
to work performance as to demonstrable need. Needs-tests 
and typically meager benefits, however, serve to curtail 
the de-commodifying effect. Thus, in nations where this 
model is dominant (mainly in the Anglo-Saxon countries), 
the result is actually to strengthen the market since all 
but those who fail in the market will be encouraged to 
contract private sector welfare.
A second dominant model espouses compulsory state 
social insurance with fairly strong entitlements. Yet, 
again, this may not automatically secure substantial de­
commodification, since this hinges very much on the 
fabric of eligibility and benefit rules. Germany was the 
pioneer of social insurance, but over most of the century 
can hardly be said to have brought about much in the way 
of de-commodification through its social programs. 
Benefits have depended almost entirely on contributions 
and, thus, work and employment. In fact, before the 
Second World War, average pensions in the German 
insurance system for workers were lower than prevailing 
poverty assistance rates (Myles, 1984). The consequence, 
as with the social assistance model, was that most 
workers would chose to remain at work rather than retire. 
In other words, it is not the mere presence of a social 
right, but the corresponding rules and preconditions that 
dictate the extent to which welfare programs offer 





























































































The third dominant model of welfare, namely the 
Beveridge-type citizens benefit, may, at first glance, 
appear the most de-commodifying. It offers a basic, equal 
benefit to all irrespective of prior earnings, 
contributions or performance. It may indeed be a more 
solidaristic system, but not necessarily de-commodifying 
since, only rarely, have such schemes been able to offer 
benefits of such a standard that they provide recipients 
with a genuine option to that of working.
De-commodifying welfare states are, in practice, of 
very recent date. A minimalist definition must entail 
that citizens can freely, and without potential losses of 
job, income or general welfare, opt out of work under 
conditions when they, themselves, consider it necessary 
for reasons of health, family, age or even educational 
self-improvement; when, in short, they deem it necessary 
for participating adequately in the social community.
With this definition in mind, we would, for example, 
require of a sickness insurance that individuals be 
secured benefits equal to normal earnings, the right to 
absence with minimal proof of medical impairment, and for 
the duration that the individual deems necessary. These 
conditions, it is worth noting, are those usually enjoyed 
by academics, civil servants and higher echelon white 
collar employees. Similar requirements would be made of 
pensions, maternity leave, parental leave, educational 
leave and unemployment insurance.
Some nations have moved towards this level of de­
commodification, but only recently and, in many cases, 
with significant exemptions. Thus, in almost all nations 
benefits were upgraded to almost equal normal wages in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. But, in some countries 




























































































illness is still required; in others, entitlements depend 
on long waiting periods of up to two weeks; and, in still 
others, the duration of entitlements is very short (in 
the United States, for example, unemployment benefit 
duration is maximally six months, compared to 30 in 
Denmark). Overall, the Scandinavian welfare states tend 
to be the most de-commodifying; the Anglo-Saxon the 
1east.
The Welfare State as a System of Stratification
the relationship 
remains severely
Despite the emphasis given to it in both classical 
political economy and in T .H .Marsha11's pioneering work, 
between citizenship and social class 
neglected, both theoretically and 
empirically. Generally speaking, the issue has either 
been assumed away (it has been taken for granted that the 
welfare state creates a more egalitarian society), or it 
has been approached narrowly in terms of income 
distribution or in terms of whether education promotes 
upward social mobility. A more basic question, it seems, 
is what kind of stratification system is promoted by 
social policy. The welfare state is not just a mechanism 
that intervenes in, and possibly corrects, the structure 
of inequality; it is, in its own right, a system of 
stratification. It orders actively and directly social 
relat ions.
Comparatively and historically, we can easily 
identify alternative systems of stratification embedded 
in welfare states. The poor relief tradition, and its 
contemporary means-tested social assistance offshoot, was 
conspicuously designed for purposes of stratification. By 




























































































within the ranks of thesocial dualisms, especially 
working classes. It comes as no surprise that this model 
of welfare has been a chief target of labor movement 
attacks.
The social insurance model promoted by conservative 
reformers such as Bismarck and von Taaffe was also 
explicitly a form of class politics. It sought, in fact, 
to achieve two simultaneous stratification results. The 
first was to consolidate divisions among wage earners by 
legislating distinct programs for different class and 
status groups, each with its own conspicuously unique set 
of rights and privileges designed to accentuate the 
individual's appropriate station in life. The second 
objective was to tie the loyalties of the individual 
directly to the monarchy, or central state authority. 
This was Bismarck's motive when he promoted a direct 
state supplement to the pension benefit. This state- 
corporati vist model was pursued mainly in nations such as 
Germany, Austria, Italy and France and often resulted in 
a labyrinth of status-specific insurance funds (in France 
and Italy, for example, there exist more than 100 status- 
distinct pension schemes).
Of special importance in this corporatist tradition 
was the establishment of particularly privileged welfare 
provisions for the civil service ("Beamten"). In part, 
this was a means of rewarding loyalty to the state and in 
part, a way of demarcating this group's uniquely exalted 
social status. We should, however, be careful to note 
that the corporatist status-differentiated model springs 
mainly from the old guild tradition. The neo-absolutist 
autocrats, such as Bismarck, saw in this tradition a 




























































































The labor movements were as hostile to the 
corporatist model as they were to poor relief-- in both 
cases for obvious reasons. Yet, the alternatives first 
espoused by labor were no less problematic from the point 
of view of uniting the workers as one solidaristic class. 
Almost invariably, the model that labor first pursued was 
that of the self-organized friendly societies or 
equivalent union- or party-sponsored fraternal welfare 
plan. This is not surprising. Workers were obviously 
suspicious of reforms sponsored by a hostile state, and 
saw their own organizations not only as bases of class 
mobilization, but also as embryos of an alternative world 
of solidarity and justice, as a microcosm of the 
socialist haven to come. Nonetheless, these micro- 
socialist societies often became problematic class 
ghettos that divided rather than united workers. 
Membership was typically restricted to the strongest 
strata of the working class and the weakest --who needed 
protection most -- were most likely outside. In brief, 
the fraternal society model contradicted the goal of 
working class mobilization.
The socialist ghetto approach was an additional 
obstacle when socialist parties found themselves forming 
governments and having to pass the social reforms they so 
long had demanded. For reasons of political coalition 
building and broader solidarity, their welfare model had 
to be recast as welfare for the "people". Hence, the 
socialists came to espouse the principle of universal ism 
and, borrowing from the liberals, typically designed on 
the lines of the democratic flat-rate, general revenue 
financed, Beveridge model.
As an alternative to means-tested assistance and 




























































































promotes status equality. All citizens are endowed with 
similar rights, irrespective of class or market position. 
In this sense, the system is meant to cultivate cross­
class solidarity, a solidarity of the nation. But, the 
solidarity of flat-rate universal ism presumes an 
historically peculiar class structure; one in which the 
vast majority of the population are the "little people" 
for whom a modest, albeit egalitarian, benefit may be 
considered adequate. Where this no longer obtains, as 
occurs with growing working class prosperity and the rise 
of the new middle classes, flat-rate universal ism 
inadvertently promotes dualism because the better off 
turn to private insurance and to fringe-benefit 
bargaining to supplement modest equality with what they 
have decided are accustomed standards of welfare. Where 
this process unfolds (as in Canada or the United 
Kingdom), the result is that the wonderfully egalitarian 
spirit of universalism turns into a dualism similar to 
that of the social assistance state: the poor rely on the 
state, and the remainder on the market.
It is not only the universalist, but in fact all 
historical welfare state models which have faced the 
dilemma of class structural change. But, the response to 
prosperity and middle class growth has been varied and 
so, therefore, has been the stratificational outcome. The 
corporatist insurance tradition was, in a sense, best 
equipped to manage new and loftier welfare state 
expectations since the existing system could technically 
be upgraded quite easily to distribute more adequate 
benefits. Adenauer's 1957 pension reform in Germany was a 
pioneer in this respect. Its avowed purpose was to 
restore status differences that had eroded due to the old 
insurance system's incapacity to provide benefits 




























































































from contribution- to earnings-graduated benefits without 
altering the framework of status-distinctiveness.
In nations with either a social assistance or a 
universalistic Beveridge-type system, the option was 
whether to allow the market or the state to furnish 
adequacy and satisfy middle class aspirations. Two
alternative models emerged from this political choice. 
The one typical of Great Britain and most of the Anglo 
Saxon world was to preserve an essentially modest 
universal ism in the state and allow the market to reign 
for the growing social strata demanding superior welfare. 
Due to the political power of such groups, the dualism 
that emerges is not merely one between state and market, 
but also between forms of welfare state transfers: in 
these nations, one of the fastest growing components of 
public expenditure is tax-subsidies for so-called 
"private" welfare plans. And the typical political effect 
is eroding middle class support for what is less and less 
a universalistic public sector transfer system.
Yet another alternative has been to seek a synthesis 
of universal ism and adequacy outside of the market- This 
road has been followed in the countries where, by 
mandating or legislation, the state includes the new 
middle classes by erecting a luxurious second-tier, 
universally inclusive, earnings related insurance scheme 
on top of the flat-rate egalitarian one. Notable examples 
are Sweden and Norway. By guaranteeing benefits tailored 
to expectations, this solution re-introduces benefit 
inequalities, but effectively blocks off the market. It 
thus succeeds in retaining universal ism and, therefore, 
also the degree of political consensus required to 
preserve broad and solidaristic support for the high 





























































































Welfare states vary considerably with respect to 
their principles of rights and stratification. This 
results in qualitatively different arrangements between 
state, market and the family. The welfare state 
variations we find, are therefore, not linearly 
distributed, but clustered by regime-types.
In one cluster, we find the "liberal" welfare state, 
in which means-tested assistance, modest universal 
transfers, or modest social insurance plans predominate. 
These cater mainly to a clientele of low income, usually 
working class, state dependents. It is a model in which, 
implicitly or explicitly, the progress of social reform 
has been severely circumscribed by traditional, liberal 
work-ethic norms; one where the limits of welfare equal 
the marginal propensity to demand welfare instead of 
work. Entitlement rules are therefore strict and often 
associated with stigma; benefits are typically modest. In 
turn, the state encourages the market, either passively 
by guaranteeing only a minimum, or actively by 
subsidizing private welfare schemes.
The consequence is that this welfare state regime 
minimizes de-commodification-effects, effectively 
contains the realm of social rights, and erects a 
stratification order that blends a relative equality of 
poverty among state welfare recipients, market- 
differentiated welfare among the majorities, and a class- 
political dualism between the two. The archetypical 
examples of this model are the United States, Canada, and 
Australia. Nations that approximate the model are 




























































































A second regime-cluster is composed of nations such 
as Austria, France, Germany and Italy. Here, the 
historical corporatist-statist legacy was upgraded to 
cater to the new "post-industrial" class structure. In 
these "corporativist" welfare states, the liberal 
obsession with market efficiency and commodification was 
never pre-eminent and, as such, the granting of social 
rights was hardly ever a seriously contested issue. What 
predominated was the preservation of status 
differentials; rights, therefore, were attached to class 
and status. This corporativism was subsumed under a state 
edifice perfectly ready to displace the market as a 
provider of welfare; hence, private insurance and 
occupational fringe benefits play a truly marginal role 
in this model. On the other hand, the state's emphasis on 
upholding status differences means that its 
redistributive effects are negligible.
But, the corporativist regimes are also typically 
shaped by the Church, and therefore influenced by a 
strong commitment to the preservation of traditional 
family patterns. Social insurance typically excludes non- 
working wives, and family benefits encourage motherhood. 
Day care, and similar family services, are conspicuously 
underdeveloped, and the "subsidiarity principle" serves 
to emphasize that the state will only interfere when the 
family's capacity to service its members is exhausted. An 
illustrative example is German unemployment assistance. 
Once a person has exhausted his/her entitlement to normal 
unemployment insurance, eligibility for continued 
assistance depends on whether one's family commands the 
financial capacity to aid the unfortunate; this obtains 




























































































The third, and clearly smallest, regime-cluster is 
composed of those countries in which the principles of 
universal ism and de-commodifying social rights were 
extended also to the new middle classes. We may call it 
the "social democratic" regime-type since, in these 
nations, social democracy clearly was the dominant force 
behind social reform. Norway and Sweden are the clearest 
cases, but we should also consider Denmark and Finland. 
Rather than tolerate a dualism between state and market, 
between working class and middle class, the social 
democrats pursued a welfare state that would promote an 
equality of the highest standards, rather than an 
equality of minimal needs as was pursued elsewhere. This 
implied, first, that services and benefits be upgraded to 
levels commensurable to even the most discriminate tastes 
of the new middle classes; and, secondly, that equality 
be furnished by guaranteeing workers full participation 
in the quality of rights enjoyed by the better off-
This formula translates into a mix of highly de- 
commodi fying and universa1istic programs that, 
nonetheless, are tailored to differentiated expectations. 
Thus, manual workers come to enjoy rights identical to 
those of salaried white collar employees or civil 
servants; all strata and classes are incorporated under 
one universal insurance system; yet, benefits are 
graduated according to accustomed earnings. This model 
crowds out the market and, consequently, inculcates an 
essentially universal solidarity behind the welfare 
state. All benefit, all are dependent, and all will 
presumably feel obliged to pay.
The social democratic regime's policy of emanci­
pation addresses both the market and the traditional 




























































































model, the principle is not to wait until the family's 
capacity to aid is exhausted, but to pre-emptively 
socialize the costs of familyhood. The ideal is not to 
maximize dependence on the family, but capacities for 
individual independence. In this sense, the model is a 
peculiar fusion of liberalism and socialism. The result 
is a welfare state that grants transfers directly to the 
children, and takes direct caring responsibilities for 
children, the aged and the helpless. It is, accordingly, 
committed to a heavy social service burden, not only to 
service family needs, but also to permit women to chose 
work rather than the household.
Perhaps the most salient characteristic of the 
social democratic regime is its fusion of welfare and 
work. It is, at once, a welfare state genuinely committed 
to a full employment guarantee, and a welfare state 
entirely dependent on its attainment. On the one side, it 
is a model in which the right to work has equal status to 
the right of income protection. On the other side, the 
enormous costs of maintaining a solidaristic, 
uni versa1istic and de-commodifying welfare system means 
that it must minimize social problems and maximize 
revenue income. This is obviously best done with most 
people working, and the fewest possible living off social 
transfers.
While it is empirically clear that welfare states 
cluster, we must recognize that no single case is pure. 
The social democratic regimes of Scandinavia blend 
crucial socialist and liberal elements. The Danish and 
Swedish unemployment insurance schemes, for example, are 
still essentially voluntarist. Denmark's labor movement 
has been chronically incapable of pursuing full 




























































































resistance to active manpower policies. And in both 
Denmark and Finland, the market has been allowed to play 
a decisive role in pensions.
Neither are the liberal regimes pure. The American 
social security system is redistributive, compulsory and 
far from actuarial. At least in its early formulation, 
the New Deal was as social democratic as was contemporary 
Scandinavian social democracy. In contrast, the 
Australian welfare state would appear exceedingly close 
to the bourgeois-1iberal ideal-type, but much of its 
edifice has been the co-responsibility of Australian 
labor. And, finally, the European corporatist regimes 
have received both liberal and social democratic 
impulses. Social insurance schemes have been 
substantially de-stratified and unified in Austria, 
Germany, France and Italy. Their extremely corporativist 
character has thus been reduced.
Notwithstanding the lack of purity, if our essential 
criteria for defining welfare states have to do with the 
quality of social rights, social stratification, and the 
relationship between state, market and family, the World 
is composed of distinct regime-clusters. Comparing 
welfare states on scales of more or less or, indeed, 
better or worse, will yield highly misleading results.
THE CAUSES OF WELFARE STATE REGIMES
If welfare states cluster into three distinct regime 
types, we are confronted with a substantially more 
complex task of identifying the causes of welfare state 
differences. What is the explanatory power of 




























































































working class political power in accounting for regime 
types? A first superficial answer would be: very little. 
The nations we study are all more or less similar with 
regard to all but the working class mobilization 
variable. And we find very powerful labor movements and 
parties in each of the three clusters. A theory of 
welfare state developments must clearly reconsider its 
causal assumptions if we wish to explain clusters. The 
hope to find one single powerful causal motor must be 
abandoned; the task is to identify salient interaction 
effects. Based on the preceding arguments, three factors 
in particular should be of importance: the nature of 
(especially working-) class mobilization; class-political 
coalition structures; and the historical legacy of regime 
inst i tut ionali zat ion.
As we have noted, there is absolutely no compelling 
reason to believe that workers will automatically and 
naturally forge a socialist class identity; nor is it 
plausible that their mobilization will look especially 
Swedish. The actual historical formation of working class 
collectivities will diverge, and so also will their aims 
and political capacities. Fundamental differences appear 
both in trade unionism and party development. A key 
element in trade unionism is the mix of craft and 
industrial unions. The former is prone to particularism 
and corporativism; the latter is inclined to articulate 
broader, more universal objectives. This blend decisively 
affects the scope for labor party action and also the 
nature of political demands. Thus, the dominance of the 
AFL in pre-war United States was a major impediment to 
social policy development. Likewise, the heavily craft- 
oriented Danish labor movement, compared to its Norwegian 
and Swedish counterparts, blocked social democracy's 




























































































employment. In the United States, craft unions believed 
that negotiating occupational benefits was a superior 
strategy, given their privileged market position. In 
Denmark, craft unions jealously guarded their monopoly on 
training and labor mobility. Conversely, centralized 
industrial unionism will tend to present a more unified 
and consolidated working class clientele to the labor 
party, making policy consensus easier, and power 
mobilization more effective. It is clear that a working 
class mobilization thesis must pay attention to union 
structure.
Equally decisive is political or denominational 
union fragmentation. In many nations, for example 
Finland, France and Italy, trade unionists are divided 
between socialist and communist parties; white collar 
unions are politically unaffiliated or divide their 
affiliation among several parties. Denominational trade 
unionism has been a powerful feature in Holland, Italy 
and other nations. Since trade unionism is such a 
centrally important basis for party mobilization, such 
fragmentation will weaken the left and thus benefit the 
non-socialist parties' chances of power. In addition, 
fragmentation may entail that welfare state demands will 
be directed to many parties at once. The result may be 
less party conflict over social policy, but it may also 
mean a plurality of competing welfare state principles. 
For example, the subsidiarity principle of Christian 
workers will conflict with the socialists' concern for 
the emancipation of women.
The structure of trade unionism may, or may not, be 
reflected in labor party formation. But, under what 




























































































outcomes from specific party configurations? There are 
many factors that conspire to make it virtually 
impossible to assume that any labor, or left, party will 
ever be capable, single-handedly, of structuring a 
welfare state. Denominational or other divisions aside, 
it will be only under extraordinary historical 
circumstances that a labor party alone will command a 
parliamentary majority long enough to impose its will. We 
have noted that the traditional working class has, 
nowhere, ever been an electoral majority. It follows that 
a theory of class mobilization must look beyond the major 
leftist party. It is an historical fact that welfare 
state construction has depended on political coalition 
building. The structure of class coalitions is much more 
decisive than are the power resources of any single 
class.
The emergence of alternative class coalitions is, in 
part, determined by class formation. In the earlier 
phases of industrialization, the rural classes usually 
constituted the single largest electorate. If social 
democrats wanted political majorities, it was here that 
they were forced to look for allies. Therefore, it was 
ironically the rural economy that was decisive for the 
future of socialism. Where the rural economy was 
dominated by small, capital intensive family farmers, the 
potential for an alliance was greater than where it 
rested on large pools of cheap labor. And, where farmers 
were politically articulate and wel1-organized (as in 
Scandinavia), the capacity to negotiate political deals 
was vastly superior.
The role of the farmers in coalition formation and, 
hence, in welfare state development is clear. In the 




























































































red-green alliance for a fu11-employment welfare state in 
return for farm price subsidies. This was especially true 
in Norway and Sweden, where farming was highly precarious 
and dependent on state aid. In the United States, the New 
Deal was premised on a similar coalition (forged by the 
Democratic party) but with the important difference that 
the labor intensive South blocked a truly universalistic 
social security system, and opposed further welfare state 
developments. In contrast, the rural economy of 
Continental Europe was very inhospitable to red-green 
coalitions. Often, as in Germany and Italy, much of 
agriculture was labor intensive and labor unions and left 
parties were seen as a threat. In addition, the 
conservative forces on the continent had succeeded in 
incorporating farmers into "reactionary" alliances, 
helping to consolidate the political isolation of labor.
Political dominance was, until after World War II, 
largely a question of rural class politics. The 
construction of welfare states in this period was, 
therefore, dictated by which force captured the farmers. 
The absence of a red-green alliance does not necessarily 
imply that no welfare state reforms were possible. On the 
contrary, it implies which political force came to 
dominate their design. Great Britain is an exception to 
this general rule, because the political significance of 
the rural classes eroded before the turn of the century. 
In this way, Britain's coalition logic showed at an early 
date the dilemma that faced most other nations later, 
namely that the new white collar middle classes 
constitute the linchpin for political majorities. The 
consolidation of welfare states after World War II came 
to depend fundamentally on the political alliances of the 
new middle classes. For social democracy, the challenge 




























































































without sacrificing the commitment to solidarity.
Since the new middle classes have, historically, 
enjoyed a relatively privileged position in the market, 
they have also been quite successful in meeting their 
welfare demands outside the state or, as civil servants, 
by privileged state welfare. Their employment security 
has traditionally been such that full employment has been 
a peripheral concern. Finally, any program for drastic 
income equalization is likely to be met with great 
hostility among a middle class clientele. On these 
grounds, it would appear that the rise of the new middle 
classes would abort the social democratic project and 
strengthen a liberal welfare state formula.
The political position of the new middle classes 
has, indeed, been decisive for welfare state 
consolidation. Their role in shaping the three welfare 
state regimes described earlier is clear. The 
Scandinavian model relied almost entirely on social 
democracy's capacity to incorporate them in a new kind of 
welfare state: one that provided benefits tailored to the 
tastes and expectations of the middle classes, but 
nonetheless retained universal ism of rights. Indeed, by 
expanding social services and public employment, the 
welfare state participated directly in manufacturing a 
middle class instrumentally devoted to social democracy.
In contrast, the Anglo-Saxon nations retained the 
residual welfare state model precisely because the new 
middle classes were not wooed from the market into the 
state. In class terms, the consequence is dualism. The 
welfare state caters essentially to the working class, 
and to the poor. Private insurance and occupational 




























































































electoral importance of the latter, it is quite logical 
that further extensions of welfare state activities are 
resisted. Indeed, the most powerful thrust in these 
countries is an accent on fiscal welfare; i.e. on tax 
expenditures and deductions for private sector welfare 
plans.
The third, Continental European, welfare state 
regime has also been patterned by the new middle classes, 
but in a different way. The cause is historical. 
Developed by conservative political forces, these regimes 
institutionalized a middle class loyalty to the 
preservation of both occupationally segregated social 
insurance programs and, ultimately, to the political 
forces that brought them into being. Adenauer's great 
pension reform in 1957 was explicitly designed to 
resurrect middle class loyalties.
CONCLUSION
We have here presented an alternative to a simple
class mobilization 
It is motivated by
theory of welfare state development, 
the analytical necessity of shifting 
from a linear to an interactive approach with regard to 
both welfare states and their causes. If we wish to study 
welfare states, we must begin with a set of criteria that 
define their role in society. This role is certainly not 
to spend or tax; nor is it necessarily that of creating 
equality. We have presented a framework for comparing 
welfare states that takes into consideration the 
principles for which the historical actors willingly have 
struggled and mobilized. And, when we focus on the 
principles embedded in welfare states, we discover 




























































































or "less" around a common denominator.
The salient forces that explain the crystallization 
of regime differences are interactive. They involve, 
first, the pattern of working class political formation 
and, second, the structuration of political coalitions 
with the historical shift from a rural economy to a 
middle class society. The question of political coalition 
formation is decisive.
Third, past reforms have contributed decisively to 
the institutionalization of class preferences and 
political behavior. In the corporatist regimes, 
hierarchical status-distinctive social insurance cemented 
middle-class loyalty to a peculiar type of welfare state. 
In the liberal regimes, the middle classes became 
institutionally wedded to the market. And, in 
Scandinavia, the fortunes of social democracy after the 
war were closely tied to the establishment of a middle 
class welfare state that benefits both its traditional 
working class clientele and the new white collar strata. 
In part, the Scandinavian social democrats were able to 
do so because the private welfare market was relatively 
undeveloped and, in part, because they were capable of 
building a welfare state with features of sufficient 
luxury to satisfy the tastes of a more discriminating 
public. This also explains the extraordinarily high cost 
of Scandinavian welfare states.
But, a theory that seeks to explain welfare state 
growth should also be able to understand its retrenchment 
or decline. It is typically believed that welfare state 
backlash movements, tax revolts, and roll-backs are 
ignited when social expenditure burdens become too heavy. 



























































































sentiments over the past decade have generally been 
weakest where welfare spending has been heaviest, and 
vice-versa. Why?
The risks of welfare state backlash depend not on 
spending, but on the class character of welfare states. 
Middle class welfare states, be they social democratic 
(as in Scandinavia) or corporatist (as in Germany), forge 
middle class loyalties. In contrast, liberal, residualist 
welfare states found in the United States, Canada and, 
increasingly, Britain depend on the loyalties of a 
numerically weak, and often politically residual social 
stratum. In this sense, the class coalitions in which the 
three welfare states were founded, explain not only their 





























































































1. Adam Smith is often cited but rarely read. A closer 
inspection of his writings reveals a degree of 
nuance and a battery of reservations that 
substantially qualify a delirious enthusiasm for the 
blessings of capitalism.
2. In the Wealth of Nations (Smith, 1961 :I I:236), he 
comments on states that uphold the privilege and 
security of the propertied as follows: "...civil 
government, so far as it is instituted for the 
security of property, in reality instituted for the 
defence of the rich against the poor, or of those 
who have some property against those who have none 
at all".
3. This tradition is virtually unknown to Anglo-Saxon 
readers, since so little has been translated into 
English. A key text which greatly influenced public 
debate and later social legislation was Adolph 
Wagner's, Rede Ueber die Soziale Frage (1872). For 
an English language overview of this tradition of 
political economy, see Schumpeter (1954), and 
especially Bower (1947).
From the Catholic tradition, the fundamental texts 
are the two Papal Encyclicals, Rerum Novarum (1891) 
and Quadrogesimo Anno (1931). The social Catholic 
political economy's main advocacy is a social 
organization where a strong family is integrated in 
cross-class corporations, aided by the state in 
terms of the subsidiarity principle. For a recent 
discussion, see Richter (1987).
Like the liberals, the conservative political 
economists also have their contemporary echoes, 
although substantially fewer in number. A revival 
occurred with Fascism's concept of the Corporative 
("Standische") state of Ottmar Spann in Germany. The 
subsidiarity principle still guides much of German 
Christian Democratic politics (see Richter, op-cit).
4. Chief proponents of this analysis are the German 
"state derivation" school (Muller & Neususs,1973); 
Offe (1972); O'Connor (1973); Gough (1979); and also 
the work of Poulantzas (1973). As Skocpol and Amenta 




























































































approach is far from one -dimensional- Thus, Offe, 
O'Connor and Gough identify the function of social 
reforms as being also concessions to mass demcinds 
and as potentially contradictory.
Historically, socialist opposition to parliamentary 
reforms was principled less by theory than by 
reality. August Bebel, the great leader of German 
social democracy, rejected Bismarck's pioneering 
social legislation, not because he did not favour 
social protection, but because of the blatantly 
anti-socialist and divisionary motives behind 
Bismarck's reforms.
5. This realization came from two types of experiences. 
One, typified by Swedish socialism in the 1920s, was 
the discovery that not even the working class base 
showed much enthusiasm for socialization. In fact, 
when the Swedish socialists established a special 
commission to prepare plans for socialization, it 
concluded after 10 years of exploration that it 
would be practically quite impossible to undertake. 
A second kind of experience, typified by the 
Norwegian socialists and Blum's Popular Front 
government in 1936, was the discovery that radical 
proposals could easily be sabotaged by the 
capitalists' capacity to withhold investments and 
export their capital abroad.
This is obviously not a problem for the 
parliamentary class hypothesis alone; structural 
Marxism faces the same problem of specifying the 
class character of the new middle classes. If such a 
specification fails to demonstrate that it 
constitutes a new working class, both varieties of 
Marxist theory face severe (although not identical) 
problems.
7. This literature has been reviewed in great detail by 
a number of authors. See, for example, Wilensky et 
al. (1985). For excellent and more critical
evaluations, see Uusitalo (1984), Shalev (1983) and 
Skocpol & Amenta (1986).
8. This section derives much of its material from 
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